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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses various issues associated with getting
technology development of nuclear power systems moving at a pace which
will support the anticipated need for such systems in later years. The
projected power needs of such advanced space elements as growth space
stations and lunar and planetary vehicles and bases are addressed
briefly, and the relevance of nuclear power systems is discussed. A
brief history and status of U.S. nuclear reactor development is provided,
and some of the problems (real and/or perceived) are dealt with briefly.
Key areas on which development attention should be focused in the near
future are identified, and a suggested approach is recommended to help
accelerate the process.
BACKGROUND FOR A MANNED MARS MISSION: THE RELATIONSHIP OF POWER
REQUIREMENTS TO OTHER SPACE POWER ACTIVITIES
The next major US program for the development of space infrastruc-
ture will be a manned space station scheduled to be operational in the
early 1990's. I'2 The space station program will provide for an
expandable manned facility to conduct scientific and commercial
activities. The facility will be serviced from the Earth by the shuttle.
Envisioned is an evolving facility, increasing in capacity, fea-
tures, and capability to support research and development activities,
materials processing, and other tasks which are, or may prove to be, cost
beneficially performed in the unique environment of space mlcrogravity
and near vacuum. Too, the space station is anticipated to serve as a key
element to the expansion of space exploration and utilization, including
the possibilities of establishing a manned base on the Moon and missions
to Mars. As this evolution of the space station use occurs, the power
requirements of the station, including the accommodation of future scien-
tific and commercial activities, can reasonably be expected to grow. The
basic question is simply how best to meet these future requirements in a
timely, cost effective fashion.
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The initial space station power requirements are projected to amount
to a connected load of about 200 kWe, with peak loads in the 100-200 kWe
range, average loads in the 90-100 kWe range, and with station keeping
requirements amounting to 25-35 kWe. These ranges provide for 6-8 person
crews and include the best estimates for the experimental and/or commer-
cial tasks.3 The power source will be photovoltaics, the only available
system capable of supplying this magnitude of power in the time frame
deslred. The magnitude of these power loads strains the applicability of
photovoltatc systems--the systems simply become very large, constitute a
real design concern, and are a serious constraint to future space
activity expansion possibilities.
The second generation space station, although il]-deCin_d at this
time, is projected to require power levels in the range of oc_-300 kWe.
If space activities expand as might reasonably be expected, this modest
growth in power requirements may prove to be seriously underestimated,
particularly if commercial processing of materials proves viable. It
would be unfortunate indeed if the horizons of space station activities
were to become constrained by the lack of a suitable power source.
Establishing a manned base on the Moon or visiting Mars makes the
power supply question even more serious. Both the Moon and Mars have
day/night cycles to contend with and the solar source strength decreases
with distance from the Sun. For the long-duration Mars mission, the
choice of feasible power sources is very restricted. The power require-
ments for either of these two mlssions are unknown because the plannlng
is in such an early state, but life-support and in-transit experimenta-
tion can be expected to be comparable to that of the space station, i.e.,
up to a few hundred kilowatts. If, in addition, nuclear electric propul-
sion is used, we might reasonably expect levels up to a few thousands of
kilowatts.
The anticipated growth of the space station power requirements noted
above provides a good example of the problem the space nuclear power
supply developers have to contend with: should a reactor power supply be
developed that attempts to be all things to all missions, i.e., is highly
flexible in its ability to meet a wide varlety of missions, or should the
development of a reactor system await a specific mission definition and
be customized to this mission? This leads, of course, to a chicken-and-
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egg situation which will be addressed subsequently. Suffice it to say
that, for power requirements of several hundreds of kilowatts or more, no
nuclear power source exists or is even far enough along in the definition
stage (much less the development stage) for NASA to reasonably assume
probable availability within the next i0 years.
STATUS OF SPACE NUCLEAR REACTOR DEVELOPMENT
The history and status of space nuclear reactor development can be
summarized quickly. In 1965 the US launched the SNAP 10A reactor system,
a nominal 0.5 kWe power plant consisting of a zirconium hydride
moderated, fully enriched uranium core, a beryllium reflector which
contained control drums for startup in orbit, and a thermoelectric power
conversion system mounted on a waste heat rejection conical radiator.
The reactor was liquid metal cooled with pumping of the liquid metal by a
electromagnetic pump. The power system was successfully launched into
Earth orbit, started up, and operated for over 40 days with a performance
level as designed and in accordance with an identical and simultaneously
operated ground based system. Operation ceased upon the failure
(suspected) of a voltage regulator.
Further launchings were postponed because of the lack of missions
requiring the particular capabilities of SNAP 10A and because of the
successful development of solar electric systems. The fact of the matter
is that for the NASA or DoD applications of that era, SNAP 1OA was unable
to compete in a cost effective manner.
The development of the SNAP 10A and the associated engineering
phases conducted for the 3 kWe SNAP 2, the 30 kWe SNAP 8, and the 50-100
kWe thermionic reactor systems resulted in a considerable amount of
space-speclflc reactor system technology. These activities took place
during the period from the late 50s to 1972, and the technologies in-
cluded dynamic (turbine) power conversion systems, thermionic and
thermoelectric conversion, shadow shielding, development of system and
sub-system analysis techniques, compact reactor design and analysis,
related launch and orbital safety aspects. In
program to develop a nuclear rocket for space
through a relatively extensive experimental phase.
all terminated at year's end in 1972.
addition, an active
propulsion proceeded
These programs were
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The US renewed its' interest in space reactor power in 1981 with a
modest study activity that has become known as the SP-iO0 program. The
first objective of this program has been to reevaluate the competing
technologies which might be capable of providing 100 kWe for periods up
to 7 years in duration. To date the old technologies have all been
revisited, evaluated in light of advances during the intervening years,
and reduced to four candidate power conversion systems: in-core
thermionics, Brayton cycle (expansion of a hot gas through a turbine),
Stirling cycle (a reciprocating piston engine), and thermoelectrics.
Selection of one of these systems took place in July 1985 and a Request
for Proposal for the selected system development Is to be issued.
A second space reactor program has only recently been initiated to
develop reactor power systems for the Strategic Defense Initiatives
program. This so-called multtmegawatt program encompasses systems beyond
the capability of the SP-IO0 project and includes nuclear propulsion as
well. The program is classified and consequently its status cannot be
presented here.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS
The achievement of a successful space reactor program will not occur
overnight. Considerable applied research and engineering development is
required to advance beyond the achievements of the 1960's. This R&D
encompasses many technology areas, will require the services of our "best
and brightest," and wlll be expensive and tlme-consuming. The key areas
and potential solutions are already identified, so the problem is not
that of fundamental technical feasibility, but rather of conducting the
systematic studies, experiments, breadboard testing, component prototype
and demonstration, and finally of building flight-quallfieddevelopment
hardware.
Here,
to provide
only a few key R&D areas are touched on, with a few examples
an indication of the types of issues being addressed (or
projected to be within the immediate future).
It should be emphasized from the outset that the overriding
consideration for the development of a space reactor power source is that
the system must be safe. Safe means safe in every aspect: from con-
struction and checkout testlng, through delivery to the launch slte,
during launch and startup, throughout its useful life, and after shut-
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down. This applies to the crew, support personnel, and the general
public. Every aspect of the R&D is guided by this consideration. A
safety record at least comparable to that of commercial power reactor
program, which by any measure Is unparalleled in the technologies of
power generation, can and must be achieved.
For the reactor power source, the key areas requiring attention are
fuels which: (1) can accommodate requirements In the event of a launch
failure under worst-possible scenarios (e.g., immersion), and (2) will
provide long llfe through the accommodation of fission products and the
use of burnable poisons; mechanical/neutronlc control systems which pro-
vide acceptable margins of safety and redundancy under all situations and
which will operate reliably and accurately for long periods; cooling
systems which will not introduce additional safety complexity, constitute
a single point of failure, vulnerability, or require excessive power for
achieving their function of maintaining system temperatures at design
levels; neutronic shields which are light-weight and stable with regard
to radiation damage; and overall reactor systems that are reliable in
their operation and flexible with regard to their operational power level
and longevity or which can accommodate changes in these parameters with a
minimum of difficulty.
The general objectives for power conversion systems (PCS) follow the
same line of thought: they must not constitute a compromise to safety at
any phase of the mission, they must operate reliably for long periods
under essentially maintenance-free conditions, they must be adaptable to
a wide variety of mission-specific conditions and requirements, and they
must be capable of power level growth with a minimum of system modifica-
tion or flight requaliflcation. These will be the governing principles,
whether the PCS is a static (thermoelectric, thermionic), or dynamic
(Brayton, Rankine or Stirling cycle) system.
As adjuncts to the PCS, electrical transmission to the payloads,
power conditioning, and system control also require considerable atten-
tion. These areas are equally crucial to achieving attractive reactor-
based power systems but are not considered to constitute limitations to
feasibility. Power transmission includes laser, tether, or microwave
options (allowing separation between the reactor power source and
radiation-sensitive areas), all of which have appealing features on paper
765
but which also have significant problems to their practical realization.
Highly efficient power conditioning, capable of accommodating a wlde
variety of operational conditions and high (for space) combinations of
currents and voltages, will be required for the power levels of interest.
System controls will likely be required to incorporate artificial
intelligence in the form of a real-time "expert system", combining the
desirable features of sophisticated process control with systems which
will automatically detect, analyze, and correct disturbances using on-
line fault-free analysis, faster-than-real-tlme predictions, and auto-
mated decision making.
In space, waste heat rejection can be accommodated by thermal radia-
tion or very specific applications possibly by a mass loss means.
Development of light-weight materials for radiators, geometrical
configurations which change according to the amount of heat being
rejected, and mass ejection devices are all under consideration, but the
practical realization of any of the options at higher power levels is far
from being clearly defined. Complicating the development is the strong
interdependence between the amount of heat to be rejected and the design
features of the rest of the system, including the payload requirements.
To repeat, these development requirements cannot be resolved over-
night and will not be resolved within a time frame useful for a lunar
base or Mars mission unless a broad and concerted technology development
effort is soon undertaken. If the US is serious about establishing a
meaningful space infrastructure beyond the space station and in making
significant technological advances which unquestionably will have conse-
quences far beyond just the space mission applications, then this commit-
ment to development must be pursued. NASA must take initiative for this
to happen.
TH___EEREALPROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING SPACE NUCLEAR REACTOR SYSTEMS
As NASA well knows and has experienced, the real problems of
developing and delivering technologically advanced systems do not tend to
be only technical in nature, but rather political and budgetary. The
Manhattan and Apollo projects are good examples of the importance of
these factors. Nuclear programs, in addition to these "normal" factors,
must also contend with a further complexity: the perceived "safety" of
anything having to do with nuclear-derived energy. As the civilian power
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program in this and other countries have amply demonstrated, public
participation in matters nuclear have become an accepted way of life.
The nuclear community is well aware of this fact of life, and hence the
previously stressed emphasis on ensuring safety through all phases of a
nuclear system's lifetime.
Fortunately, the use of nuclear power plants in space for NASA
missions will likely involve little general public concern, provided the
launch safety can be shown not to entail a radiation risk (avoided by
system startup only after a safe orbit has been achieved) and the systems
are not used in low Earth orbit, where a repetition of the Cosmos 954
reentry could be perceived. Technically, these safety issues can be or
are resolved. More likely, the misconceptions and safety concerns will
come from the higher echelons of NASA who are in politically sensitive or
vunerable positions and who will be on the firing line with the public,
with Congress, and the the Executive Branch. It will be important for
these persons to be knowledgeable about the nuclear aspects and the
detailed attention accorded to the safety issue. Those within the
nuclear community are confident that, properly handled, the safety issue
can be a non-lssue, but it will require careful communication between DOE
and NASA to ensure that this happens, and that public sensitivity re-
ceives proper attention.
The real problem of space nuclear power is what was previously
referred to as the "chicken-and-egg" syndrome: DOE will not develop a
space reactor system for NASA without a firm mission, and NASA will not
specify a firm mission requiring a space reactor because such a system
doesn't exist and development is perceived not to be feasible within the
time frame of the mission. The problem is how to break this cycle.
The SP-100 program has taken an important first step to breaking
this cycle, but this program is too design-speciflc to achieve a broad
technology base necessary to provide latitude in achievable power level.
In contrast to the SP-100 approach, a wider perspective is needed to
facilitate the development of the technologies required to provide the
latitude in power levels, the desired power levels can be broken into
ranges, say, from I00 kWe to 1000 kWe, and from 1000 kWe to 10,000 kWe or
greater. The various technologies will require careful evaluation
through meaningful developmental tests, in and during which evolutionary
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improvements are incorporated in order to determine their true potential
with regard to operational longevity. It is vitally important that this
recommended approach be rec(u;nized for what it is: a broad technology
program, not a mission-specific one! The technology development goals
cannot be dictated by a miss:_on schedule, but must instead be based on
desired levels of performance
There are several recognized difficulties with this approach, of
course. It doesn't have any public appeal or the pizazz of an Apollo or
Mars mission. It wi].l probably not be perceived as a bold, imaginative
program [even though, in reality, it will be if pursued appropriately},
so that strong Congressional support may be difficult to obtain. A lot
of blind alleys will inevitably be pursued. It will be a politically
vulnerable program since it may not be identified with a specific large-
scale programmatic goal (the same argument advanced in the congressional
evaluation of the space station mission versus consideration of a large
1
number of smaller activities).
If NASA foresees the eventual desirability of being unconstrained by
power availability in their planning of future missions, they are going
to have to take the initiative to break this cycle. Needless to say, the
entire energy--related communily would welcome such an initiative, since
these developments would inevitably benefit terrestrial power generation
as well.
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